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In the last few years, rhetoricians of science, technology, 
engineering, and medicine (RSTEM) have provided a wide range of 
models for how rhetoricians collaborate with scientists. These 
collaborations all use rhetorical perspectives to improve science 
and science communication at sites of transdisciplinary teaching 
(Goodwin et al., 2014), research collaborations (Druschke, 2014; 
Rief, 2014), and public engagement (Walker, 2014; Parks, 2014; 
Vernon, 2014). Unfortunately, these avenues of collaboration—
across teaching, research, and engagement—tend to be discussed as 
though they are separate activities with little integration or 
understanding of how one may inform the next. For example, 
research collaborations in “applied rhetoric of science” argue that 
rhetoricians should move from “talking about science to doing 
science” (Herndl and Cutlip, 2013), and thus conceive of rhetoric as 
“a necessary and integral part of the engaged practice of science 
itself” (Druschke, 2014, 2). I agree, but would suggest that the gap 
between talking about science and doing science isn’t quite so clear. 
Even applied rhetoric of science seeks inquiry into how 
communication and talk affects citizen participation (Herndl and 
Cutlip, 2013, 6). Science communication is an area that vexes this 
distinction: Are deliberative engagements among scientists and 
publics an integral part of the engaged practice of science? Is 
communicating science with public audiences a part of doing 
science or talking about science? I’m not sure there’s a clear-cut 
answer to these questions, but my sense is that rhetoricians have an 
interest in the claim that science communication is an important 
part of doing science. After all, it is quite common for our research 
collaborations with scientists to include public engagement, or our 
transdisciplinary teaching to be part and parcel of building research 
collaborations. Perhaps it is time to start viewing these 
collaborations from a more integrated perspective.  
 Kenneth Walker 2 Poroi 12,2 (February 2017) 
To that end, my contribution to this symposium discusses how 
my collaborations with scientists in public science communication 
programs have informed an approach to transdisciplinary 
engagement that I believe can be used across sites of teaching, 
research, and public engagement. Mostly I will focus on how 
rhetorical theories of uncertainty can inform particular practices in 
science communication and vice versa. So while one of my goals 
here is to build on my previous work in science communication by 
offering particular ideas for effectively conveying rhetorical 
practices to scientists (Ceccarelli, 2013, 2014; Walker, 2014), my 
main purpose is to discuss how rhetoric of science can improve the 
doing of science communication.  
These sorts of projects are important because there is simply not 
enough rhetorical theory and practice in typical science 
communication programs. Where it does exist, it is too often 
treated in ways that do not account for the complexity, dynamism, 
and practical value of the art. A theorized rhetoric of science 
pedagogy should be able to correct for this by showing how 
collaborative science communication projects—in our teaching, 
research, and engagement—can be improved with the participation 
of rhetoricians. In what follows, I describe how the “spheres model” 
of deliberative rhetoric can be effectively used in science 
communication collaborations, and climate risk communication in 
particular. From this model I derive three rhetorical principles on 
uncertainty for transdisciplinary pedagogy and improved climate 
risk communication. Then I demonstrate the value of these 
principles through a case study that can be used across 
collaborative sites in teaching, research, and engagement. Finally, I 
end with a brief reflection on how theorizing our pedagogy or 
building theory through pedagogy is one way to integrate various 
strands of rhetorical collaborations with scientists.  
 
The Spheres Model of Uncertainty in Climate Risk 
Communication 
Much rhetorical pedagogy is based upon defining the various parts 
of a rhetorical situation—rhetor/audience, exigence, and 
constraints—and applying them to a particular case (see Grant-
Davies, 2005 for a helpful review). But as rhetorical ecology 
reminds us, rhetorical situations are not stable entities, but instead 
ongoing circulation processes and short-hands for describing a 
series of events (Edbauer, 2005, 8). When applied to science 
communication, rhetorical ecology reminds us that science 
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communication can never be fully controlled, that distortion will 
happen, and that performances are one moment in an array of 
broader discourses about science and scientists. This circulation is 
important because it constitutes publics, and thus public 
understandings of science. Science communicators must, and for 
the most part do, clearly understand these circulation processes 
because they underscore the importance of repeating a particular 
message in a clear and consistent manner by a variety of trust-
worthy sources. Conversely, it is also desirable to integrate into a 
single rhetorical performance a variety of perspectives that circulate 
in a given discourse. Jean Goodwin and the group at Iowa State, for 
example, in their work on the Midwest Climate Statement have 
shown how a collaborative group of climate scientists who integrate 
various definitions of a rhetorical situation can create performances 
that are “resilient against a range of skeptical challenges” (Goodwin 
et al., 2014, 4).  
The art of identifying the typical lines of argument that circulate 
within a discourse—what rhetoricians call topoi, or common 
topics—is related to the notion of a rhetorical situation.  This is 
because common topics often come to define an exigence—an 
urgent need, pressing issue, or problem that can be addressed and 
solved through rhetorical discourse (Grant-Davies, 2005, 265). In 
deliberations over climate risk, for example, uncertainties are 
common topics that can serve as heuristics for climate risk 
communication. Definitions of uncertainty are diverse, but most 
distinguish it from related terms like ignorance, indeterminacy, and 
risk (Wynne, 1992). For our purposes, uncertainty can be defined as 
“a situation where more than one outcome is consistent with our 
expectations” (Pielke, 2007, 55), or a situation in which “we know 
that we do not know, but that is almost all that we know” (Callon et 
al., 2009, 20). To be sure, in order for a polysemous concept such 
as uncertainty to be effectively conveyed requires some productive 
constraints. Lynda Walsh and I have recently argued for an 
understanding of uncertainties based upon the “spheres of 
discourse” model where uncertainty arguments circulate, translate, 
and hybridize among technical, personal, and public spheres of 
argument (Goodnight, 1982/2012; Walsh and Walker, 2016). When 
applied to science communication, it is rhetorical practices that find 
and integrate uncertainties across technical, personal, and public 
spheres of discourse that can be most effective for climate risk 
communication.  
Before discussing a specific example of locating and integrating 
uncertainties in climate risk communication, I offer a few 
uncertainty principles for science communication that can help put 
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the spheres model into practice. These principles are dynamic and 
can be used in any order. They are helpful mostly in pedagogical 
and public engagement contexts, but also have implications for 
cross-disciplinary research collaborations. In short, these principles 
are meant to be practices that help performances of climate risk 
communication productively mediate between scientific inquiry, 
affective dimensions of personal concern, and values-based 
decision-making. Here they are with some catchy titles:  
1) Name and Frame Uncertainties. Name 
scientific uncertainties, but primarily speak to 
what science does know and is certain about. 
Then, reframe uncertainties as the domain of 
public deliberation about risk.  
2) Recognize Audience Uncertainties as 
Opportunities. Listen to the concerns, 
questions, and positions of your audience by 
inquiring about them. Recognize that 
uncertainties are ideologically contested sites for 
audiences (i.e., some use doubt to manufacture 
scientific controversy; others to pursue research; 
others to stoke public anxiety and fear, with 
reason or not), and as such they represent 
opportunities for co-constructing knowledge 
about science, the scientific process, and its 
contribution to reasoned debate and informed 
decision-making. 
3) Use Uncertainties to Facilitate Personal 
and Public Judgments About Risk. 
Negotiating uncertainty effectively means 
learning to facilitate a political conversation 
about how publics understand and evaluate risk. 
When done effectively, publics can use these 
conversations to reflect on the relationships 
among situated knowledge, identity, and 
action—among what we know, who we are, and 
what to do. 
For scientists communicating climate risk, negotiating 
uncertainties is all about using technical expertise to help publics 
understand their own identities and values in terms of risk. In the 
following sections, I discuss how rhetoricians might use the three 
principles above as a rhetorical pedagogy in classrooms and 
engagement contexts with implications for research collaborations.  
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Negotiating Uncertainties with Skeptical 
Audiences in Climate Risk Communication  
Setting up a debate with a skeptical audience is a fairly common 
practice in both rhetorical pedagogy and science communication. 
To demonstrate the three principles, I offer in this section an 
analysis of a deliberative exchange between a climate scientist and 
an audience of climate skeptics. The climate scientist is Dr. Stephen 
Schneider, who is widely regarded as one of the most effective 
climate science communicators of the last generation. In June of 
2010, just a few weeks before his untimely death, he agreed to 
participate in an Australian show called Insight, where he and a 
moderator engaged in a deliberation with 52 climate skeptics in an 
attempt to change their minds about the reality of human-induced 
climate change. Though Schneider’s health was deteriorating, he 
was in sharp form during this engagement—so much so that others 
have noted the exemplary nature of this particular performance 
(Revkin, 2011).  In his attempt to mutually construct his desired 
exigency with the audience (i.e., the reality of human-induced 
climate change), Schneider expertly integrated the uncertainties 
circulating within this deliberative forum. I have a few problems 
with his performance, which I will describe later, but it does serve 
as a remarkable example of locating and integrating uncertainties 
to help audiences co-construct an understanding of the 
relationships among scientific processes, personal judgments, and 
collective actions in climate risk.  
From the beginning, the forum is established as a deliberative 
conversation about doubt and belief on the issue of climate change. 
The believer, Schneider, smiling wryly as if he knows what’s 
coming, sits on the stage next to the moderator.  He listens and 
responds to the audience’s questions. The show begins with 
comments from a number of skeptics who describe why they do not 
believe in human-induced global warming. Schneider responds by 
drawing a distinction between belief and evidence: “Your beliefs 
have to be built upon looking at the whole wide range of evidence” 
(Cinqmil, 2015). This distinction is used to hybridize two 
uncertainties: personal doubt/belief must be informed by the 
certainty/uncertainty of technical evidence. When the rhetorical 
situation is established as belief-based technical evidence, few 
people in the audience can match Schneider’s scientific expertise. 
Some try. Much of the deliberative engagement follows a basic 
pattern: The skeptical audience defines a reason for doubt. 
Schneider responds by providing technical information explaining 
why this or that particular reason is misguided or not. Many of the 
audience’s reasons for doubt are standard fare for climate skeptics: 
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climate change is hysteria for scientists to get grant money; climate 
change is natural and not man-made; the climate has always 
changed therefore there’s nothing to worry about; climate change is 
beneficial; the temperature gauges are biased toward urban heat 
islands, and more. At times, it appears Schneider finds this process 
to be tedious. But he demonstrates good will by showing up, 
engaging these questions about climate science, and speaking to 
people’s values. Schneider is clearly a believer in climate science 
communication.   
Much of Schneider’s performance is about correcting the 
audience’s misinformation or misinterpretation of climate science. 
But he also consistently acknowledges where the science is 
uncertain. For example, in a discussion about the IPCC and 
acknowledgement of uncertainties by assigning confidence scales to 
various outcomes, Schneider says, “I have long been a believer that 
you must frame things in terms of the uncertainties associated with 
them” (Cinqmil, 2015). He readily admits there are areas where 
climate science is uncertain because it doesn’t have the data. In a 
question about trust, another skeptical audience member says, “I 
would like to see you people admit some doubt.” Schneider replies, 
“Go read my book, I’ve been doing that for 40 years.” Later an 
audience member asks a question about how lay publics should 
know whom to trust when publics don’t know enough and both 
scientists and skeptics seem to have credible points. Schneider 
responds that it is those who are talking not in certainties but in 
probabilities—ranges, bell curves, wheels of fortune—that’s who 
you trust with complex problems: “So I think the best guide for you 
is, when there’s a complex problem, remember you can break it 
down into well-established bits where we do have some things that 
are very likely; competing explanations—like Greenland is 
melting, but exactly why we don’t know why; and [the] speculative: 
we really don’t know what the cloud feedback amount [is] going to 
be.  When people talk like that, they are much more likely to be 
credible” (Cinqmil, 2015, italics mine).   
What Schneider understands is that enacting principle 1—name 
and frame uncertainties and acknowledge where science is still 
uncertain, but primarily speak to what science knows—facilitates 
trust. Schneider realizes it is important to acknowledge 
uncertainties because interpretations of uncertainty are a battle-
ground in public discourse. They shape how publics approach 
science and its politics. At the same time, demonstrating expert 
knowledge in the relevant subject allow the speaker to become 
more credible to skeptical audiences. On a similar point Schneider 
says, “It is not a scientist’s job to judge whether or not the risks are 
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sufficient to hedge against … [better or worse] possibilities. It is 
only our job to report risk.” In other words, value judgments about 
policy are not the scientist’s job; that is the job of the larger public 
deliberations and public policies to which scientists contribute. In 
his attempt to reframe uncertainties as the domain of public 
deliberation, Schneider often makes his own personal value 
judgments explicit: “I don’t take 10% risks with planetary life 
support systems. That’s my personal view. That’s my personal 
values and I always say that” (Cinqmil, 2015). These kinds of 
integrated uncertainty arguments effectively transition technical 
uncertainties, the domain of expertise, to public uncertainties, the 
domain of public policy. In short, when a climate expert such as 
Schneider locates his personal values, and integrates them with 
technical un/certainties, he reframes the discussion of climate risk 
as in the domain of public deliberation. Once Schneider locates and 
integrates these uncertainties, he can get back to his primary mode 
of communication, going into nerdish detail about how scientists 
calibrate tree rings to temperature. 
Another skeptical audience member, Dr. Ian Rivlin, asks a 
question about how the seemingly tiny amount of 3% of CO2 that 
humans produce can have such an impact when nature produces 
the other 97%: “How can small changes in our production of CO2 
impact upon something as large as the earth? It seems absurd” 
(Cinqmil, 2015). Schneider explains the CO2 production based on 
the natural cycles of the season, and uses the metaphor of a family 
budget.  Dr. Rivlin interrupts because he thinks Schneider is not 
answering the question. Schneider clarifies his belief.  “You believe 
there cannot be an accumulation of CO2 because we only produce 
3% … Oh, you’re totally wrong.” Then he offers this analogy: 
If you have a bathtub and you turn it on so you’re getting 
a gallon coming in a minute, alright. And now the drain 
is opened up to the point where a gallon is going out in a 
minute. So there’s a flow in and a flow out. That’s an 
analogy to the fact that there is a very large flow of 
carbon dioxide naturally going into the system in the 
summertime and coming out in the winter. Much larger 
than the 3%, I agree with that. However, it’s in balance. 
The amounts are the same. So when you add the 3% it’s 
3% this year, and next year, and next year, so it 
accumulates. … so the water in the bathtub is going to 
rise. That is completely well established. It’s been 
established for a long time, and if you don’t accept that, 
you really need to study science. You’re just wrong 
(Cinqmil, 2015). 
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Metaphors about risk are one of Schneider’s favorite risk 
communication tools.  Later in the show a skeptic-turned-believer 
cites the metaphor of the bathtub as the moment that converted 
her. Both the metaphor of the family budget and the bathtub are 
relatable to people’s lives and they communicate a threat. As such, 
they are good tools for enacting principle 3: Use uncertainties to 
facilitate personal and public judgments about risk. Risk 
metaphors serve as a relay for technical evidence, but they are 
communicated in a fashion that personalizes risk, such as an 
unbalanced family budget or a flooded house. When communicated 
publicly in this forum, personal risks become public value 
judgments about normative actions in the face of these risks. Not 
only does Schneider re-establish his technical expertise against the 
lay audience member, but through the risk metaphor he quickly 
and effectively personalizes risk and establishes normative value 
judgments about it. Presumably, few want to go bankrupt or have 
their house flooded. Risk metaphors like these are remarkable tools 
for climate risk communicators because of their ability to translate 
technical uncertainties into personal and public judgments about 
risk. Schneider uses a variety of them—loaded dice, wheels of 
fortune, bell curves—frequently.   
Janet Thompson, a well-versed and well-prepared cattle 
rancher, charges Schneider for being an alarmist in his use of 
language like ocean acidification (the ocean is alkaline, not acidic, 
as she correctly points out).  Furthermore, she claims CO2 is 
logarithmic, and therefore cannot be accumulating… a picky point.  
She ends by stating, “I’m concerned about the general amount of 
alarmism that is out there and the terminology that is being used.” 
Schneider responds, “I’m concerned that you’re kind of repeating a 
mantra from discredited information.”  Then, after a technical 
explanation, he states, “When people try to say that because CO2 is 
a logarithmic absorber and therefore makes no difference they 
either do not understand climate science or they are polemicizing 
because it is absolutely in every single model. It has long been 
accounted for and it is completely understood” (Cinqmil, 2015). 
The exigence in this exchange is afforded by the word ‘concern.’ 
The exigence for the cattle rancher is Schneider’s alarmism. For 
Schneider it is repeated polemics from discredited sources or 
manufactured scientific controversies (Ceccarelli, 2011). Schneider 
counters manufactured scientific controversy with Principle 2: 
Recognize audience uncertainties as opportunities. When 
confronted with what he identifies as a manufactured scientific 
controversy, he immediately reframes the uncertainty as an 
opportunity to voice concern over characters who repeat 
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misinformation. He then solidifies his own expert information in 
certain terms like “absolutely,” “accounted for,” and “completely 
understood.” At the same time, when Schneider encounters 
audience uncertainties that he recognizes as well intentioned, he 
uses the opportunity to bring the audience along the scientific 
process with statements like, “I am actually very pleased that you’re 
a skeptic. There’s no such thing as a good scientist who is not a 
skeptic”; and “That very good question you asked is exactly the 
same question that climate scientists have been asking themselves 
for 30-40 years” (Cinqmil, 2015). In recognizing audience 
uncertainties as opportunities Schneider validates or invalidates 
inquiry based upon his interpretation of a worthy question—a 
position not unfamiliar to many teachers. After another moment of 
identification with the audience in which they identify perpetrators 
of hate mail and hate speech as a common enemy, an audience 
member says, “Thank you for actually engaging in dialogue 
sensibly. And basically not demonizing someone who dares to raise 
a doubt.” But when the moderator asks if she is still a skeptic, she 
says, “I was never quite sure, to be honest. I just don’t know 
enough” (Cinqmil, 2015). These audience remarks exemplify why 
uncertainty is an opportunity. Doubts and uncertainties are sources 
of deliberative engagement in which a great amount of mutual 
learning can happen. This particular audience member is uncertain, 
but when approached with sensible engagement, she is willing to 
listen.   
From my rhetorical perspective, Schneider’s use of a 
deterministic scale to quantify uncertainty and his preference for 
technical expertise and meta-institutions over public participation 
in complex issues like climate change, gives me some pause. He 
believes scientists should guide audiences toward the correct 
interpretation of facts to improve people’s environmental literacy 
and thus public policy.  So for him, technical expertise is still more 
important than public participation in policy making. As Chris 
Russill has noted, Schneider was more concerned with how 
scientists could contribute to the larger public discussion over 
climate risk than he was about understanding and situating climate 
science with other important voices in pluralistic democracies 
(Russill, 2010, 64-65).  
Publicly communicating uncertainty and risk is immensely 
challenging work for risk communicators, particularly because 
scientific uncertainties do not fit with the norms of public media. 
The value of the spheres model of uncertainty for risk 
communication is that it incorporates Schneider’s insights while 
also allowing for the potential integration of personal and public 
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uncertainties that may or may not value precautionary approaches 
as much as climate scientists do. The rhetorical practices discussed 
here are not necessarily attempts to derive consensus, but instead 
to make value judgments explicit so they can be recognized instead 
of masquerading as valid technical inquiry.  
 
Conclusion 
Rhetorical practices deriving from the spheres model of uncertainty 
stem from collaborations with scientists in public science 
communication programs (Walker, 2014). It is easy to see how 
these examples might be used in science and risk communication 
workshops. These principles and practices also carry implications 
for undergraduate program development and research 
collaborations. At my institution, we are using these kinds of 
curricular practice in professional rhetoric and writing certificates 
to attract a wide audience of STEM students across campus. These 
conversations are happening at the same time our program is 
developing grant projects with faculty across campus who are 
interested in training their advanced undergraduate and graduate 
students in science communication. These conversations in turn 
have led to discussions of current research projects in which 
rhetorically trained communicators might contribute. In short, 
deriving heuristics as principles and practices from rhetorical 
theory help me do double work. First, they allow me to honor the 
relationships that established this transdisciplinary work by serving 
our professional writing and rhetoric program through curricular 
development. Second, they provide the environmental science 
students access to science communication courses at fairly early 
stages in their academic and professional careers. Over time, our 
hope is if these students and faculty see value in this kind of 
training, we will have something to build on. 
Copyright © 2017 Kenneth Walker 
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